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Abstract
Cable and satellite television have grown rapidly throughout the developing world. The
availability of cable and satellite television exposes viewers to new information about the outside
world, which may aect individual attitudes and behaviors. This paper explores the eect of the
introduction of cable television on gender attitudes in rural India. Using a three-year
individual-level panel dataset, we nd that the introduction of cable television is associated with
improvements in women's status. We nd signicant increases in reported autonomy, decreases in
the reported acceptability of beating and decreases in reported son preference. We also nd
increases in female school enrollment and decreases in fertility (primarily via increased birth
spacing). The eects are large, equivalent in some cases to about ve years of education in the
cross section, and move gender attitudes of individuals in rural areas much closer to those in
urban areas. We argue that the results are not driven by pre-existing dierential trends. These
results have important policy implications, as India and other countries attempt to decrease bias
against women.
1 Introduction
The growth of television in the developing world over the last two decades has been extraordinary.
Estimates suggest that the number of television sets in Asia has increased more than six-fold, from
100 million to 650 million, since the 1980s (World Press Review, 2003). In China, television exposure
grew from 18 million people in 1977 to 1 billion by 1995 (World Press Review, 2003). In more recent
years, satellite and cable television availability has increased dramatically. Again, in China, the
number of people with satellite access increased from just 270,000 in 1991 to 14 million by 2005.
Further, these numbers are likely to understate the change in the number of people for whom
television is available, since a single television is often watched by many.
Beyond providing entertainment, television vastly increases both the availability of
information about the outside world and exposure to other ways of life, particularly in otherwise
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1isolated areas. Previous work has demonstrated that the information and exposure provided by
television can change attitudes and behavior. Gentzkow and Shapiro (2005) nd eects of television
viewership on attitudes in the Muslim world towards the West, and Della Vigna and Kaplan (2006)
show large eects of the Fox News channel on voting patterns in the United States. In the
developing world, Olken (2006) shows that television decreases participation in social organizations.
India has not been left out of the satellite revolution: a recent survey nds that 112 million
households in India own a television, with 61 percent of those homes having cable or satellite service
(National Readership Studies Council 2006). This gure represents a doubling in cable access in just
ve years from a previous survey. The study also nd that in some states, the change has been even
more dramatic; in the span of just 10-15 years since it rst became available, cable or satellite
penetration has reached an astonishing 60 percent in states such as Tamil Nadu, even though the
average income is below the World Bank poverty line of two dollars per person per day.
Most popular satellite television shows in India portray life in urban settings; further, a wide
range of international programs are now available. The increase in television exposure, therefore, is
likely to dramatically change the available information about the outside world, especially in isolated
rural areas. Indeed, anthropological case studies in India suggest that exposure to television in rural
areas has an eect on behaviors as disparate as latrine building and fan usage (Johnson, 2001).
In this paper we explore the eect of the introduction of cable television in rural areas of
India on a particular set of values and behaviors, namely attitudes towards and discrimination
against women. Although issues of gender equity are important throughout much of the developing
world, they are particularly salient in India. Sen (1992) argued that there were 41 million \missing
women" in India { women and girls who died prematurely due to mistreatment { resulting in a
dramatically male-biased population. The population bias towards men has only gotten worse in the
last two decades, as sex-selective abortion has become more widely used to avoid female births (Jha
et al, 2006). More broadly, girls in India are discriminated against in nutrition, medical care,
vaccination and education (Basu, 1989; Griths et al, 2002; Borooah, 2004; Pande, 2003; Mishra et
al, 2004; Oster, 2007). Even within India, gender inequality is signicantly worse in rural than urban
areas. Given this, if satellite television increases the exposure of rural areas to urban attitudes and
values, it is plausible that it could change some of these attitudes and behaviors. It is this possibility
that we explore in this paper.
The analysis relies on a three-year panel dataset covering women in ve Indian states
between 2001 and 2003. These years represent a time of rapid growth in rural cable access. During
2the panel, cable television was newly introduced in 21 of the 180 sample villages.1 Our empirical
strategy relies on comparing changes in attitudes and behaviors between survey rounds across
villages based on whether (and when) they added cable television.
Using these data, we nd that cable television has large eects on attitudes and, to the
extent we have information, behaviors. After cable is introduced to a village, women are less likely to
report that domestic violence towards women is acceptable. They also report increased autonomy
(for example, the ability to go out without permission and to participate in household
decision-making). Women are less likely to report son preference (the desire to give birth to a boy
rather than a girl). Turning to behaviors, we nd increases in school enrollment for girls (but not
boys), and decreases in fertility (which is often linked to female autonomy). These results are
apparent when using regressions with individual xed eects and when using a matching estimator.
In terms of magnitude, the introduction of cable television dramatically decreases the
dierences in attitudes and behaviors between urban and rural areas { between 45 and 70 percent of
the dierence disappears within two years of cable introduction in this sample. The eect is also
large relative to, for example, the eect of education on these attitudes and behaviors: introducing
cable television is equivalent to roughly ve years of female education in the cross section. These
eects happen very quickly; the average village has cable for only 6-7 months before being surveyed
again, which implies a rapid change in attitudes. However, this is consistent with existing work on
the eects of media exposure, which typically nd rapid changes (within a few months, in many
cases) in behaviors like contraceptive use, pregnancy, latrine building and perception of own-village
status (Pace, 1993; Johnson, 2001; Kane et al, 1994; Valente et al, 1998; Rogers et al, 1999).
A central concern with the results is the possibility that trends in other variables (for
example, income or \modernity") are driving both cable access and attitudes. We argue that this
does not seem to the case. Changes in attitudes between the rst two survey waves are not
predictive of cable introduction between the second and third wave. Further, among villages that
add cable during the survey period, initial attitudes are not predictive of which year (2002 or 2003)
they get access.
It is dicult to identify the mechanism behind the eects in this paper precisely. However,
we do nd some suggestive evidence that the mechanism alluded to at the start of the paper {
1Cable television in these villages is generally introduced by an entrepreneur, who purchases a satellite dish and
subscription, and then charges people (generally within 1km of the dish) to run cables to it. In this sense, people are
actually accessing satellite channels. We will use the terms cable and satellite interchangeably to refer to programming
not available via public broadcast signals. Our interest is with the content of programming available to households,
rather than the physical means of delivery of that content.
3increased exposure to circumstances outside of the village { is operating. In particular, we nd that
the eects of cable are largest in areas with initially worse attitudes towards women, i.e., those for
whom cable is providing information most dierent from their current way of life. Although certainly
not conclusive, this evidence is consistent with a model in which television changes the weight
individuals put on the behaviors of their immediate peer group in forming their attitudes.
The results are potentially quite important for policy. Gender discrimination in India is a
signicant issue, and has been a consistent source of concern for policy makers and academics (Sen,
1992; World Bank, 2001; Duo, 2005; World Bank, 2006). A large literature in economics, sociology
and anthropology has explored the underlying causes of discrimination against women in India,
highlighting the dowry system, low levels of female education, and other socioeconomic factors as
central factors (Rosenzweig and Shultz, 1982; Agnihotri, 2000; Agnihotri et al., 2002; Murthi et al.,
1995; Rahman and Rao, 2004; Qian, 2006). Changing these underlying factors is dicult;
introducing television, or reducing any barriers to its spread, may be less so.
From the policy perspective, however, there are potential concerns about whether the
changes in reported autonomy, beating attitudes, and son preference actually represent changes in
behaviors, or just in reporting. For example, we may be concerned that exposure to television only
changes what the respondent thinks the interviewer wants to hear about the acceptability of beating,
but does not actually change how much beating is occurring. This concern is likely to be less
relevant in the case of fertility or education; the former is directly veriable based on the presence of
a baby in the household, and the latter is listed as part of a household roster. The fact that we nd
eects on these variables provides support for the argument that our results represent real changes in
outcomes. Without directly observing people in their homes, however, it is dicult to conclusively
separate changes in reporting from changes in behavior. However, even if cable only changes what is
reported, it still may represent progress: changing the perceived \correct" attitude seems like a
necessary, if not sucient, step toward changing outcomes.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides background on
television in India and discusses existing anthropological and ethnographic evidence on the impact of
television on Indian society. Section 3 describes the data and empirical strategy. Section 4 discusses
the results, including the eects on attitudes and behaviors, and robustness checks. Section 5 briey
explores the possible mechanisms behind the change in attitudes and behaviors, and Section 6
concludes.
42 Background on Television in India
State-run black and white television was introduced into India in 1959, but the take o was
extremely slow for the rst several decades { by 1977, only around 600,000 sets had been sold. In
1982, however, the state-run broadcaster (Doordarshan) introduced color television, which
dramatically increased interest in, and viewership of, television. Even with color, however, most
programming remained either government-sponsored news or information about economic
development. There were a few entertainment serials, which were watched with intensity.2 In the
early 1990s CNN and STAR TV rst introduced the possibility of access to non-government
programming via satellite. There was a large demand for this cable (satellite) television, which was,
and continues to be, lled primarily by small entrepreneurs who buy a dish and a subscription and
charge nearby homes to connect to it. This is especially true in rural villages, such as those in our
sample. As we show in the data later, this means that cable access is more common in villages that
are wealthier and have a higher population density, where more people can aord to pay for service
and where it would therefore be more protable to start a cable business. However, dramatic declines
in the prices of both the equipment and satellite service subscriptions (due in part to reduced taris
and increased competition), coupled with income growth, have allowed cable to spread over time to
more and more villages. In the 5 years from 2001 to 2006, about 30 million households, representing
approximately 150 million individuals, added cable service (National Readership Studies Council
2006). And since television is often watched with family and friends by those without a television or
cable, the growth in actual access or exposure to cable may have been even more dramatic.
The program oerings on cable television are quite dierent than government programming.
The most popular shows tend to be game shows and soap operas. As an example, among the most
popular shows in both 2000 and 2007 (based on Indian Nielsen ratings) is \Kyunki Saas Bhi Kabhi
Bahu Thi," (Because a Mother-in-Law was Once a Daughter-in-Law, Also) a show based around the
life of a wealthy industrial family in the large city of Mumbai. As can be seen from the title, the
main themes and plots of the show often revolve around issues of family and gender. Among satellite
channels, STAR TV and Zee TV tend to dominate, although Sony, STAR PLUS and Sun TV are
also represented among the top 20 shows. Viewership of the government channel, although relatively
high among those who do not have cable, is extremely low among those who do (and limited largely
to sporting events).
2This background information detailed here is drawn largely from Mankekar, 1999 and
http://www.indiantelevision.com/indianbrodcast/history/historyoftele.htm
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In contrast to the West, television seems to be, in some cases, the primary medium by which people
in rural villages in India get information about the outside world (Scrase, 2002; Mankekar, 1993;
Mankekar, 1998; Johnson, 2001; Fernandes, 2000). For example, Johnson (2001) reports on a man in
his 50's in a village in India who says that television is \the biggest thing to happen in our village,
ever". He goes on to say that he learned about the value of electric fans (to deal with the heat) from
television, and subsequently purchased one. The same author quotes another man arguing that
television is where they learned that their leaders were corrupt, and about using the court system to
address grievances.
On issues of gender specically, television seems to have had a signicant impact, since this
is an area where the lives of rural viewers dier greatly from those depicted on most popular shows.
By virtue of the fact that the most popular Indian serials take place in urban settings, women
depicted on these shows are typically much more emancipated than rural women. For example,
many women on popular serials work outside the home, run businesses and control money. In
addition, they are typically more educated and have fewer children than their rural counterparts.
Further, in many cases there is access to Western television, with its accompanying depiction of life
in which women are much more emancipated. Based on anthropological reports, this seems to have
aected attitudes within India. Scrase (2002) reports that several of his respondents thought
television might lead women to question their social position and might help the cause of female
advancement. Another woman reports that, because of television, men and women are able to \open
up a lot more" (Scrase, 2002). Johnson (2001) quotes a number of respondents describing changes in
gender roles as a result of television. One man notes, \Since TV has come to our village, women are
doing less work than before. They only want to watch TV. So we [men] have to do more work. Many
times I help my wife clean the house."
Although television overall seems to have had large eects, cable television in particular
may be even more signicant. This is both because it dramatically increases television viewership
(see Section 3), and because the content is very dierent (again, since popular serials mostly feature
urban life). Scrase (2002) reports on respondents who note that prior to cable there was almost no
entertainment, and very little current aairs, whereas the oerings on cable were broad.
There is also a broader literature on the eects of television exposure on gender issues in
other countries. Many studies nd eects on a variety of outcomes: for example, eating disorders in
Fiji (Becker, 2004), sex role stereotypes in Minnesota (Morgan and Rothschild, 1983) and
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have provided a fruitful context for studying the eects of television. For example, based on
ethnographic research, La Pastina (2004) argues that exposure to telenovelas provides women (in
particular) with alternative models of what role they might play in society. Pace (1993) describes the
eect of television introduction in Brazil on a small, isolated, Amazon community, arguing that the
introduction of television changed the framework of social interactions, increased general world
knowledge and changed people's perceptions about the status of their village in the wider world.
Kottak (1990) reports on similar data from isolated areas in Brazil, and argues that the introduction
of television aects (among other things) views on gender, moving individuals in these areas towards
having more liberal views on the role of women in both the workplace and in relationships.
Interestingly, the studies in Brazil also suggest that the patterns of television viewing
shortly after it is rst introduced may be quite dierent than what is seen later on. The evidence
suggests that in the rst years after introduction, interactions with the television are more intense,
with the television drawing more focus (both at an individual level, and community-wide). It is
during this early period that Kottak (1990) and others argue that television is at its most inuential.
Most of the villages in our analysis are at this early stage of television exposure, suggesting this may
be an ideal period to look for eects.
The evidence described above, of course, is drawn primarily from interviews and case
studies, and obviously does not reect a random sample of these populations. Nevertheless, the
overall impression given by the anthropology and sociology literature is that the introduction of
television had widespread eects on society, and that gender issues are a particular focal point. Our
data and setting provide an opportunity to test this hypothesis more rigorously.
3 Data and Empirical Strategy
3.1 Data
This paper relies on data from the Survey of Aging in Rural India (SARI), a panel survey of 2,700
households, each containing a person aged 50 or older, conducted in 2001, 2002 and 2003 in four
states (Bihar, Goa, Haryana,and Tamil Nadu), and the capital, Delhi. The sample was selected in
two stages: in the rst stage, 180 clusters were selected at random from district lists (40 clusters in
Bihar, Haryana and Tamil Nadu, 35 in Delhi and 25 in Goa), and in the second stage, 15 households
were chosen within each cluster through random sampling based on registration lists. Other than
7Delhi, the survey was conned to rural areas. Attrition over the panel was low, with just 108 (4
percent) of the original households dropping out by the third round.
All women in the sample households aged 15 and older were interviewed. Several sections of
this survey were modeled to be compatible with other demographic surveys for India, such as the
National Family and Health Survey (NFHS). The survey collected information on a range of (current
and past) demographic, social and economic variables. In addition, a village-level survey was
conducted in each sample cluster, gathering information on economic and social conditions and
infrastructure.
Most relevant for our analysis, the survey asked women a series of questions intended to
measure various dimensions of women's status. These questions were patterned after those used in
several countries as part of the Demographic and Health Surveys, as well as in the Surveys on the
Status of Women and Fertility conducted by the University of Pennsylvania Population Studies
Center. The rst set of questions deal with women's autonomy and decision-making authority. In
particular, women were asked whether they needed permission to visit the market (one question) or
to visit friends or relatives (a second question). Responses were coded on a scale of 1 to 3 (do not
need permission; need permission; not permitted at all). Women were also asked whether they are
allowed to keep money set aside to spend as they wish. In addition, women were asked, \Who makes
the following decisions in your household: Obtaining health care for yourself; purchasing major
household items; whether you visit or stay with family members or friends?" The possible responses
were: \1. Respondent; 2. Husband; 3. Respondent jointly with husband; 4. Other household
members; 5. Respondent jointly with other household members."
Second, women were asked about son preference. In particular, women who reported
wanting to have more children were asked: \Would you like your next child to be a boy, a girl or it
doesn't matter?"
Finally, given the high prevalence of domestic violence in India, women were asked their
attitudes towards such behavior. Specically, they were asked: \Please tell me if you think that a
husband is justied in beating his wife in each of the following situations: If he suspects her of being
unfaithful; if her natal family does not give expected money, jewelry or other things; if she shows
disrespect for him; if she leaves the home without telling him; if she neglects the children; if she
doesn't cook food properly."
While these measures suer from obvious limitations, in particular because they are
susceptible to reporting bias, they were designed to capture as best as possible various dimensions of
8women's status, and to be consistent with the other major surveys on women's status. However,
recognizing the limitations, in our analysis we will also make use of measures of behaviors as
indicators for, or proxies of, women's status, including fertility and girls' school enrollment. Both
behaviors are linked to women's status. Female education is generally higher in areas where women
have higher status and, importantly, is itself an input to the health and education of future
generations of women (and men). Lower fertility is often linked to female autonomy (Dyson and
Moore, 1983; Sen, 1999), in part because the value of women's time increases as the set of activities
they are permitted to do goes up. And while observed changes in fertility may represent direct
changes in attitudes regarding the optimal number or spacing of children independent of changes in
attitudes towards women, reductions in fertility or increased spacing is a useful outcome measure in
itself because it represents gains to women, in the form of reduced health risks and increased
opportunities outside of the home due to reduced child-rearing burdens.
Data on Cable Television
Crucially for this project, the village-level survey included information on cable television. Panel A
of Table 1 provides information on cable availability throughout the survey. In the rst round, 65 of
the 180 villages have cable. As stated above, this was a period of rapid expansion in cable access
throughout India. Thus, in our data, an additional 10 villages added cable by the 2002 survey and
another 11 added it by 2003. Finally, 94 villages never get cable (no villages drop cable during the
sample period). The identication of the eects of cable in the paper relies on the 21 villages that
added cable in either 2002 or 2003. For all those villages that added cable, we also gathered data on
when service rst became available.
There is signicant regional variation in access to cable. Panel B of Table 1 shows the
percent of villages/clusters in each state with cable access in 2001. Not surprisingly, the capital,
Delhi, has essentially universal access. Elsewhere, the two southern states of Tamil Nadu and Goa
have very high cable penetration, at 78 and 60 percent of villages, respectively. By contrast, coverage
in the two northern states of Bihar and Haryana is low (7 and 17 percent). While this variation may
seem extreme, or perhaps an artifact of our particular sample of rural villages, these estimates are
consistent with a 2001 national census of villages (NSSO 2003).
As noted above, television was generally available prior to cable, so it is important to
explore whether the introduction of cable had any eect on the amount of television watching. Figure
1 shows this to be the case. The gure shows the percent of people who report having watched
9television in the past week (unfortunately, the survey did not gather data on the amount of time
spent watching). There is relatively little change in watching over time in either areas that never
have cable or those that always have it. However, in villages that get cable in 2002, the share of
respondents who report watching television at least once a week jumps from 40 to 80 percent between
2001 and 2002; in villages that get cable in 2003, this share is constant between 2001 and 2002, then
increases sharply from 50 to 90 percent between 2002 and 2003. This graph suggests a strong
connection between cable availability and television viewership, with a near doubling in both cases.
Consistent with the background above, cable availability is correlated with factors that
make providing service protable at the village-level, as can be seen in Table 2, where we regress
whether a village has cable in 2001 on a range of village-level characteristics. As expected, villages
with higher mean income or a greater population density are more likely to have cable. Education
also increases the likelihood of cable. The other clear correlate is urbanization { Table 2 includes
only rural villages, so urban/rural status is not included on the right hand side. Only about half of
the rural villages have cable access, while all of the urban areas surveyed do. However, the rural
fraction with access has been increasing over time, again, due primarily to reductions in the costs of
service (coupled with increases in income).
The fact that cable availability is not exogenous is not necessarily a problem for the analysis
here. If the availability of cable did have an exogenous driver (as in Olken, 2006) the analysis would
be simple: we could just compare villages with and without cable in the cross section. Although that
is not possible here, the availability of panel data allows stable village (and individual)
characteristics to be dierenced out. Changes in other obvious factors leading to increased cable
access, such as income, can be explicitly controlled for. The primary remaining concerns are the
possibility that there is some pre-existing dierential trend between villages that do and don't add
cable, or that the changes in cable availability are driven by some unobserved factor that also causes
changes in attitudes. These concerns are discussed in more detail in Section 4.
Data on Gender Attitudes
The rst set of dependent variables to be used are measures of autonomy, attitudes toward beating
and son preference among women. The various measures of autonomy are highly correlated, but they
do contain independent information. To generate a single summary measure, therefore, we perform a
principal components analysis of the decision making variables, the permission variables and the
variable measuring whether the woman can keep her own money. The rst principal component of
10these variables captures the largest amount of variation common to all variables in the set (for a
more detailed description, see Filmer and Pritchett, 2001). The autonomy measure is this rst
principle component, which is standardized to have a mean of zero and standard deviation of one.
The attitudes measure is simply the number of situations in which the woman reports that it is
acceptable for a husband to beat his wife (0-6). Finally, the son preference variable is whether the
woman reports wanting her next child to be a boy (again, this is only observed for the sample of
women who report wanting more children).
Panel A of Table 3 summarizes the underlying variables. Overall, the reported level of
tolerance for spousal beating (which may understate actual tolerance) is high. Over 60 percent of
women feel that it is acceptable for a husband to beat his wife under at least one of the six situations
listed. On average, women report 1.6 situations in which it is considered acceptable; the mean
among women who think it is ever acceptable is 2.6. Women are most likely to believe beating is
acceptable if a wife neglects her children, goes out without permission or does not show respect
towards her husband; being a bad cook, her family not sending money or, surprisingly, if she is
unfaithful, are believed to be less valid justications for violence (though one-fth to one-quarter still
feel these are sucient justications).
With respect to decision-making, in this table we have condensed the responses to binary
indicators for whether the woman participates in the decision, either on her own or jointly with
others in the household. Overall, slightly more than half of women participate in each of the
decisions. There is some overlap in these variables, though not as much as might be suggested by the
similarity of their means; about 20 percent of women do not participate in any of the three decisions,
25 percent participate in one, 27 percent in two, and 29 percent in three. In terms of permission, just
over one-half of women report needing permission from their husband in order to go to the market
and two-thirds need permission to visit family or friends (while not shown here, less than 4 percent
are not permitted to do each of these things). By contrast, nearly three-quarters of women are
allowed to keep money set aside to spend as they wish. However, by most measures, women's status
and autonomy overall are quite low.
The table also reveals strong son preference, with 55 percent of women who want another
child preferring that child be a boy. Note in addition that the residual is not simply preferring a girl;
only about 13 percent of women want their next child to be a girl, with the remainder reporting that
the sex of the child doesn't matter (about one-quarter of the sample) or reporting something else
(such as \up to God").
11Data on Fertility and Education
The second set of dependent variables we use are measures of fertility and education. The fertility
data are based on questions on births and pregnancies asked in each survey round. In the rst round,
women were asked to list all children ever born to them, even if they were not currently alive or living
in the household. In subsequent survey rounds women were asked about any new births since the last
survey. Finally, women were asked in each round whether they were currently pregnant. We combine
these data and create a variable measuring the change in the number of children between surveys,
which includes both children conceived and born since the previous survey and current pregnancies
(children conceived before the previous survey but born between surveys are therefore counted in the
previous survey). It is important to include the current pregnancies in order to line up with the
timing of television: the theory is that television may aect the decision to have more children, or
when to have them, which will be reected in pregnancies earlier than in births. Data on the average
number of children and the average change between surveys are described in Panel B of Table 3.
Data on education are drawn from the household roster which reports information on sex,
age and activities, including school enrollment, for each individual in the household. For children
aged 6 to 14 at the time of the rst survey, we create an indicator for whether they are in school at
each survey round and, for the last two rounds, whether they dropped out in the last year. We limit
ourselves to children younger than 14 at the time of the rst survey because by the end of the panel,
children older than that may have started to marry and leave the household, and our education data
on them might therefore be less complete. The education variables are summarized in Panel B of
Table 3.
Correlations Between Women's Status and Demographics
It is informative to explore the relationship between the outcome variables (gender attitudes, fertility
and education) and various demographic characteristics. In addition to providing information about
correlates of women's status, this analysis can provide a benchmark for understanding the magnitude
of the relationship between the outcome variables and cable introduction, discussed in the results
section.
Table 4 shows the coecients from regressions of the measures of women's status on each of
the demographic variables individually (so, for example, the coecient of  0:137 in the rst row,
rst column indicates that in a regression of autonomy on rural status, with no controls, autonomy
12in rural areas is estimated to be 0:137 standard deviations lower than in urban areas). Consistent
with expectations, rural areas tend to have less favorable attitudes towards women on all dimensions,
while wealthier and more well-educated people in general have more favorable attitudes. The eects
of religion and age are more mixed, with some dierences across groups (for example, Hindus tend to
have lower female autonomy, but also a lower acceptability of beating).
3.2 Empirical Strategy
The basic empirical strategy is straightforward. For the measures of attitudes and autonomy, we run
individual-level xed eects regressions of the status measures on cable availability (measured at the
village-level). Denote the reported status for individual i in village v in year t as sivt and cable
availability in the village in year t as cvt. The primary regression estimated is
sivt = cvt + i + t + ivt
where i is a full set of individual xed eects and t is a full set of year dummies. This specication
allows us to eliminate any xed dierence across individuals and any common trends over time; the
eect of cable will be identied o of changes in village-level access to cable during the three years of
the survey. The identifying assumption is that women's status in villages that added cable would not
have otherwise changed dierently than in those villages that did not add cable; we discuss this
assumption further in the next section. The analysis includes those that do not have cable in any
round, and those that have it in all three rounds; using only the former (or leaving out all of these
\non-changers") does not change any of the results appreciably. All standard errors are clustered at
the village level to allow for correlation in errors among individuals living in the same village.
A similar strategy will be used for the analysis of fertility. Our hypothesis is that cable
aects either the total desired number of children a woman wants, or the spacing of those children.
For this analysis, the dependent variable is the change in the number of children a woman has
between survey rounds. We will also control in this regression for whether the woman was pregnant
at the time of the previous survey, to allow for the fact that some fertility spacing is generally both
desirable and biologically likely. In particular, we run the following regression
Kidsivt = cvt + pregnantiv(t 1) + i + t + ivt
where Kidsivt is the change in number of children between year t   1 and year t, and
pregnantiv(t 1) is a control for whether the woman was pregnant in year t   1 (to adjust for the fact
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reported desire to have more children, in order to examine whether changes in pregnancies/births
reect changes in total fertility, or simply the timing of pregnancies.
Finally, in the analysis of education we will focus on the same type of regression {
controlling for child-specic xed eects and examining changes over time { but our main interest
will be in comparing the eect for girls to the eect for boys. We begin by splitting the sample,
running the xed eects regression below for boys and girls separately :
enrolledivt = cvt + i + t + ivt
Our hypothesis is that  will be larger for girls than for boys. We will also consider regressions in
which the boy and girl samples are combined, and we include an interaction between gender and
cable access:
enrolledivt = 1cvt + 2(cvt  Boy) + i + t + ivt
In this case, the coecient of interest is 2, the interaction between gender and cable access. Our
hypothesis is that 2 will be negative.
Finally, in addition to these individual-level xed eects regressions, we also estimate the
eects of cable on women's status using village-level matching. We apply the bias-adjusted, nearest
neighbor matching strategy proposed by Abadie and Imbens (2002). This strategy matches each
village in both cable regimes (adds cable; does not add cable) to the village(s) in the opposite cable
regime with the `most similar' values of a set of specied covariates. The dierence in the outcome
variable is then computed for each matched pair, and the estimate is given by the mean of these
pair-wise dierences. Since the estimator is biased when matches are not exact, as is likely, the
estimator adjusts for dierences in the covariates using regression functions. Since the method
eectively estimates for each observation the value of the missing outcome variables for the
counterfactual situation using similar-looking observations in the opposite cable regime, the key
assumption is that, conditional on the covariates used for matching, getting cable is independent of
the outcome variable.
We match based on 2001 village-level characteristics: income, population density, distance
to the nearest town, education, the fraction of people who watch TV, and the level of the outcome
variable. We match using the four nearest neighbors, with matching conned to within-state only
(this is particularly relevant here given the unique outlier status of Tamil Nadu discussed below).
144 Results
This section presents the basic results on the eects of cable. The rst subsection summarizes the
eects on autonomy, attitudes towards domestic violence, and son preference. The second subsection
discusses education and fertility. The third subsection discusses the concern over whether the results
are largely driven by pre-existing dierential trends.
4.1 Beating, Autonomy and Son Preference
Before moving to the xed eects and matching estimators, we begin by showing the relationship
between the measures of women's status and village level cable access using an OLS approach. We
expect there may be some bias in the OLS results, although it is dicult to denitively sign its
direction. Villages with cable access are likely to be more urbanized and perhaps have more `modern'
attitudes, which are likely to be associated with more favorable attitudes towards women, suggesting
an upwards bias. However, there may be other drivers of cable access that are correlated with less
favorable attitudes towards women, which would push the bias in the other direction. For example,
in households where men have more power or authority, due perhaps to earning a higher fraction of
the household's income, they may assert their personal preferences to a greater extent, which may
include both spending on cable rather than other goods, and not allowing their wives signicant
autonomy.
Table 5 shows the OLS relationship between the three measures of women's status {
autonomy, beating attitudes and son preference { and cable access. Panel A shows the results with
only controls for cable access and year. The results are somewhat inconsistent. We nd that cable
access is associated with greater autonomy and reduced son preference. However, we also nd that
villages with cable have more acceptability of beating than those without it. Thus, the raw
cross-sectional results yield somewhat ambiguous conclusions regarding the eect of cable television
on women's status.
However, part of this seeming contradiction may be driven by the uneven spatial
distribution of cable access. As noted earlier, among rural areas, cable access is highest in the
southern state of Tamil Nadu. And while in general women's status is typically higher in southern
India relative to the north (ex., Bardhan 1974), one apparent exception is domestic violence in Tamil
Nadu. In our data, the average number of situations in which a woman reports it is acceptable for a
husband to beat his wife is 2.99 in Tamil Nadu, compared to 1.4, .99, 1.9 and .90 for Bihar, Delhi,
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nding is not unique to our data; results from the NFHS show
that 36 percent of women in Tamil Nadu report having ever actually been beaten by their husbands,
which is nearly double the national average of 19 (IIPS and ORC Macro 2000; the rates are 25, 10,
14 and 12 percent in Bihar, Delhi, Goa and Haryana, respectively). By contrast, but also consistent
with what other authors have noted, in the NFHS Tamil Nadu is well above average on other
measures of women's status, such as autonomy and decision-making. While there remain concerns
about reporting bias for these variables, these results conrm that our data are not unique in regard
to attitudes towards domestic violence in Tamil Nadu, and suggest a possible explanation for the
contradictory results above is some unobserved factor or attitude perhaps unique to domestic
violence that is more prevalent among households in Tamil Nadu than in other states.
In panel B, we therefore add state xed-eects to the basic regressions, in addition to a
variety of other controls, including income, education, age, and religion. The eects of cable are
dramatically smaller in magnitude in all three cases. The presence of cable in a village is associated
with an increase in women's autonomy/decision-making and a reduction in son preference. The
coecient on the number of acceptable situations for beating is still positive, but it is now very
small, and not statistically signicant. While this removes the apparent contradiction in the eects
of cable on women's status, it still at least suggests that cable may not have any eect on attitudes
towards domestic violence. However, there may of course remain other important village or
individual omitted variables that the state xed eects and other controls do not capture. Therefore,
it is important to turn to our preferred estimation strategies.
The basic xed eects results and the identication strategy are illustrated graphically in
Figures 2a, 2b and 2c. For the three measures of women's status, these gures graph the village
means over time in villages that never have cable, villages that add cable in 2002, villages that add
cable in 2003 and those that have cable in all three rounds. All three gures show the same pattern.
In areas that always have cable or never get cable the measures of women's status are relatively at,
though trending slightly upward in some cases. However, in areas that added cable by the 2002
survey, there are large improvements in women's status between 2001 and 2002, followed by smaller
gains between 2002 and 2003, suggesting the eect of cable appears very quickly. And in areas where
cable is added after the 2002 survey, there is no change between 2001 and 2002, but large
improvements between 2002 and 2003.
Again, while Figure 2b may at rst appear to contradict the overall relationship between
cable and women's status in that acceptance of domestic violence is greater in villages where cable is
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cable and the acceptability of beating is likely to be behind much of this dierence. Further, three of
the ten villages that add cable in 2002 and three of the eleven that add it in 2003 are in Tamil Nadu,
while only four percent of the villages without cable in all periods are from that state, accounting for
the higher acceptability of beating in 2001 in the villages that added cable relative to those that
never had cable. This again underscores the need to consider changes in outcomes, in order to
eliminate these and any other xed dierences.
The individual-level xed eects regressions are in Table 6. All regressions include year
dummies, alone and interacted with income and education, to allow for dierential time trends by
education and income. All three regressions show a statistically signicant eect of cable television
on women's status. Adding cable is associated with a .19 standard deviation improvement in the
measure of women's autonomy and decision-making, a .19 reduction in the average number of
situations for which beating is acceptable, and a .12 reduction in the likelihood of wanting the next
child to be a boy. For autonomy and son preference, the eects of cable are larger than the OLS
estimates with controls. And in the case of attitudes towards beating, unlike with OLS, the xed
eects estimates indicate that cable does indeed improve the situation of women.3
As discussed, both the beating attitudes and autonomy measure are generated from a larger
set of variables measuring attitudes toward beating under various situations and dierent questions
on autonomy. Although these composite measures are a convenient way to summarize these
variables, the results are quite consistent across the individual components. This can be seen in
Appendix Table 1, which estimates the eect of cable access on each component variable using the
xed eect specication. Of the twelve individual variables, nine have the expected sign (the other
three are very close to zero) and seven are statistically signicant. In absolute terms, the largest
eect is a reduction in the perceived acceptability of a husband beating his wife if she is a bad cook,
and an increase in participation in household decisions on major purchases. We can also estimate
seemingly unrelated regression models on the components of the beating attitudes and autonomy
variables and test the joint signicance of the eect of cable on these variables. Doing so yields
similar results: the chi-squared statistic for autonomy is 45.86, signicant at greater than the 1%
level, and for beating it is 22.83 (results available from the authors).
Panel A of Table 7 provides the results from the matching estimator (here we show the
3Interestingly, we do not see any evidence of backlash (attitudes or autonomy getting worse after cable introduction).
The eect of cable either improves these outcomes, or leaves them unchanged.
17average treatment eect; the results for the average treatment eect for the treated, in which
matching is undertaken only for villages that added cable, yields similar results). The results are
remarkably similar to those from the xed eects analysis. Adding cable is associated with a .16
increase in the autonomy measure. The number of acceptable situations for beating declines by .17,
and son preference declines by .13. These results are robust to using 2 or 6 matches instead of 4.
All of these results suggest large, favorable, eects of cable on women's status. To get a
rough sense of the magnitude of these eects, one option is to compare the coecients to the eects
of more traditional shifters, like education, on the same outcomes. For example, based on the
evidence in Table 4, one year of education shifts female autonomy by 0.0335. Comparing this with
the xed eect results in Table 6 suggests that introducing cable is roughly equivalent to increasing
female education by about 5.5 years in terms of the eect on attitudes. Since the average education
level is about 3.5 years, the eect is quite large.
Alternatively, and perhaps more in line with the theory that television leads to change by
increasing exposure to urban attitudes and values, we can ask whether cable television moves the
attitudes in the rural areas closer to attitudes in urban areas. We can do this by comparing the
estimates of the eect of cable to the dierences in the measures of women's status between
households in Delhi and households in rural villages without cable, and evaluate what shares of those
dierences are made up for through cable introduction. These results are shown in Table 8, which
reports the average value of the dependent variables for Delhi and rural respondents, as well as the
coecient from Table 6 and the share explained. The share explained is large in all cases, varying
from 42 to 70 percent, indicating that a signicant fraction of the gap between urban and rural areas
is closed by the introduction of cable.
These estimates of the eect of television are quite large (although, of course, the standard
errors are also large, so we cannot reject somewhat smaller eects). An important issue is, therefore,
whether it is plausible that eects of this magnitude would be seen so quickly. Villages that adopted
cable during our survey would have had it on average for only six or seven months before they were
surveyed again. Although it is dicult to directly evaluate how quickly we would expect to see
eects of cable, some of the existing literature suggests that changes in attitudes and behaviors as a
result of television (or media exposure in general) can be quite fast.
Johnson (2001) discusses a village that went from 2 to 25 latrines in a period of 4 years
after television introduction. Pace (1993) demonstrates a large decrease in the perception of
own-village status in the world with just one year of television exposure. Related, there is also a
18large literature showing rapid eects on attitudes arising from changes in media content (as opposed
to adding television).
In Tanzania, a radio soap opera promoting family planning resulted in between a 10 and 15
percentage point increase in contraceptive use within two years of the program being introduced, and
between a 3 and 7 percentage point decline in current pregnancies (Rogers et al, 1999). A
multimedia campaign (radio and television) in Mali in 1993 promoting family planning led within
just 3 months to a 20 percentage point increase in the share of individuals planning to use modern
contraceptive technology in the future (Kane et al, 1998); a radio program in the Gambia shows
similar eects within 8 months of introduction (Valente et al, 1994). Finally, there is also evidence
that when used as a vehicle for reaching a large number of people very quickly as in \social
marketing", media can have large and immediate eects as well; for example, a television and radio
family planning campaign in Nigeria increased the number of new clients at family planning clinics
three to ve fold within one month of airing (Piotrow et al. 1990). All of these examples suggest
that the eect of media exposure on attitudes and behavior may happen very quickly. This makes it,
perhaps, less surprising that we see such large eects of cable exposure within a short period of time.
Following on the overall results, it seems sensible to ask whether these eects dier across
demographic groups { for example, by age and education. To get a sense of this, we divide the
sample in half based on age or education and estimate the eect of cable on the three central
outcomes for each subgroup. These results are shown in Appendix Table 2. The results show
consistent evidence of larger eects among the better-educated. The eects also appear to be
somewhat larger among older people, although this eect is less consistent. In general, however,
these results are dicult to interpret. More educated people could be more responsive because they
are better at processing information (Grossman, 1972), but this also may reect the fact that they
are much more likely to watch television. The results on age also have a number of interpretations:
older women may have more ability to assert themselves once they come to expect more autonomy,
or they may have only their husband to convince, while younger women may have both a husband
and a mother-in-law. In general, without knowing something more about what actually goes on
within the household, these breakdowns are interesting but dicult to draw strong conclusions from.
4.2 Education and Fertility
The results in the previous subsection point to large eects of cable television on women's status.
However, one concern with these results is that we are measuring only what is reported, rather than
19directly observing the outcomes. It is possible that exposure to cable television gives women a
dierent sense of what they think the interviewer wants to hear, but does not change behavior. In
this subsection we analyze the eect of cable on female school enrollment and fertility. In contrast to
the measures in the previous section, these come from the household roster reports. Although it is,
in principle, conceivable that respondents also misreport on these rosters, it seems much less likely to
be a signicant issue.
Table 9 shows OLS regressions of indicators for children's current period school enrollment,
and women's fertility (yearly change in number of children) on cable television access. In these
regressions, cable access is positively and marginally statistically signicantly associated with both
female and male school enrollment. In column 3, cable access is signicantly negatively correlated
with fertility. However, as stated above, these regressions should be interpreted with caution, due to
the possibility of signicant omitted variable bias.
Table 10 shows the xed eect results on education. In Panel A, the dependent variable is
again a dummy for whether the child is currently enrolled in school. Column 1 shows that
introducing cable increases the likelihood of current enrollment for girls by 3.5 percentage points (the
base is 68 percent enrolled). This eect does not seem to operate for boys: the coecient is
extremely small, and not statistically signicant. In both cases, the xed eects estimates are
smaller than the OLS estimates. Column 3 includes the cable variable and the interaction between
cable and child gender. Though the magnitude of the dierence in the eect between boys and girls
is fairly large, we cannot reject that the eect is the same for both.
Since there are likely to be varying costs and returns to early and later education, columns
4-9 split the sample by whether a child is 6-10 or 11-14. The dierences by age are pronounced. For
girls aged 6-10, the eects on schooling are large and positive, increasing the likelihood of enrollment
by around 6 percentage points (from a base of 75 percent). For boys 6-10, the coecient is negative,
but it is small and not statistically signicant. Thus, the gender dierence is even greater in
magnitude but, because of the larger standard errors from the smaller samples, in the interaction
regression we can only reject the hypothesis of equality of the eects at the 10 percent level. By
contrast, the last three columns of Panel A show that there is essentially no eect of cable on
enrollment for boys or girls aged 11-14. Thus, the overall eects on schooling appear to be driven
largely by eects among the youngest children. One possible explanation is that educational
planning is largely undertaken when children are young, so exposure to cable is too late to have
much of an eect for older children.
20Panel B of Table 10 focuses on the likelihood of dropping out, rather than being in school,
which may be the more relevant measure. Focusing rst on the full sample of children aged 6-14,
cable television is associated with a large, statistically signicant decline in the likelihood of
dropping out for girls, whereas for boys the eect is positive and large, but not statistically
signicant. These eects dier greatly (13 percentage points), and in the third column, we can reject
at the 10 percent level the hypothesis that the eects are the same. When split by age, cable
television has a very large, negative eect on the likelihood of dropping out for girls aged 6-10 and
11-14, though the eect is only statistically signicant for the former. By contrast, for boys, there is
little eect among those aged 6-10, but a large, negative, but not statistically signicant eect for
older boys. However, while the point estimates of the magnitudes dier greatly for boys and girls, for
neither age group can we reject the hypothesis that the eects of cable are equal.
The results of the matching estimator presented in Panel B of Table 7 are broadly similar.
Adding cable is associated with a large, marginally statistically signicant increase in school
enrollment for girls aged 6-10. For boys, the eects are negative, but not statistically signicant. By
contrast, for older children, the eects are not statistically signicant for either boys or girls, and the
point estimates are positive for boys but negative for girls.
Thus, across the estimators, the most consistent nding is an improvement in the
enrollment of young girls. It should be noted however that while the gains for girls may reect an
improvement in women's status (either girls being more highly valued by their parents or adult
women becoming more inuential in household decision-making about their children's education), it
is also possible that the gains arise through other mechanisms. For example, television may provide
information that causes parents to update their beliefs about the returns to schooling, more so for
girls than for boys (for example, Jensen (2007) nds that students in the Dominican Republic who
watch television have higher perceived returns to education than children who do not watch).
Table 11 turns to the xed eects results for fertility. Column 1 demonstrates the overall
eect of cable on the change in number of children: the introduction of cable lowers the yearly
increase in number of children or pregnancies by 0:09. The mean of this variable is 0:14, making this
quite a large eect (in fact, much larger than the OLS eect, although of the same sign). Columns 2
and 3 divide the sample based on age, with Column 2 including only women age 35 or less and
Column 3 including only women over 35. Since there should be little or no eect for the latter group
(since fertility in India is very low among this group) this can validate that changes observed for
younger women are not just changes in reporting (i.e., cable viewers report lower fertility because
21they learn than high fertility is less acceptable among outsiders). Indeed, we nd a signicant and
large eect among young women (change in number of children is decreased by 0:14 children), but no
eect among older women. This fact is not surprising given that the average increase in children in
this older group is only 0:01, versus 0:21 in the younger age group. Panel C of Table 7 shows the
results for the matching estimator. As above, the results are similar to the xed eects results, with
an estimated eect of -0.08 for the full sample of women and -0.12 for women 35 or under.
This short-term change in fertility could reect either a change in the timing of births
(pushing them to later), or a change in the total number of eventual births. The results in Columns
1 through 3 of Table 11 are consistent with either result. It is possible to get some sense of which of
these mechanisms is producing the result by looking at the eect of television on the reported desire
for more children (though we do not know how many more children they want). This result (the
eect of cable television introduction on whether a woman, under 35, reports wanting more children)
is reported in Column 4 of Table 11. The data suggest no signicant relationship between this
measure of desired fertility and cable introduction. Taken together with the results in Columns 1
through 3, this may point to an eect of cable on birth timing, but perhaps not on overall fertility.
However, without data to test whether cable inuences the total number of additional children a
woman wants, this conclusion is only tentative. Further, delays in having children now may in fact
result in reduced eventual fertility.
As mentioned above, it is worth noting that there are a number of mechanisms through
which television access might aect fertility, including the one hypothesized here, that lower fertility
is linked to higher autonomy. For example, women may learn about birth control via informational
programs on television (Olenick, 2000; Hornik and McAnany, 2001; Rogers et al, 1999) or television
may change the amount of time people want to devote to child-rearing (Hornik and McAnany, 2001).
The results here do not allow us to separate these mechanisms; they do suggest a causal result of
television overall, but we cannot conclude with certainty that this works through increases in
autonomy. However, as an outcome in itself, delayed or reduced fertility represents a gain for women.
4.3 Alternative Explanations of the Results
While the xed eects estimates eliminate any xed dierences that may inuence both women's
status and getting cable, the central concern with these results is that they may be driven by
pre-existing dierential trends. If areas with rapidly changing attitudes towards women (or changes
in factors that in turn aect attitudes) are also more likely to get cable, we would mistakenly
22attribute those changes to the introduction of cable. Similarly, the matching estimators in eect rely
on the assumption that villages that look alike ex-ante but dier in whether they add cable might be
expected to follow similar trajectories in women's status. While these assumptions are in their
strongest form untestable, we can examine the data for any evidence of possible dierential trends.
With a long panel it would be relatively easy to test for trends. Here, we have only three
years, which limits the scope of this investigation. However, we can observe a short pre-trend for
areas where cable was introduced in 2003. If large changes in attitudes between 2001 and 2002 were
predictive of getting cable in 2003, that nding would validate the concern about pre-trends; if not,
it suggests such trends may not be important. It will only be possible to perform this test for the
beating attitudes, autonomy and son preference measures. In the case of education and fertility we
are eectively only analyzing two changes (2001-2002 and 2002-2003) so there is no pre-trend to
analyze.
To an extent, we can see the results of this test in Figures 2a-c. There is virtually no change
in attitudes, autonomy or son preference between 2001 and 2002 for those villages that got cable in
2003. If there was a strong pre-trend, we would expect to see it here. To provide a more rigorous
test, we consider the set of villages without cable in 2002 and test whether the change in attitudes
between 2001 and 2002 are predictive of who gets cable in 2003. This regression is shown in Table
12. The results indicate that changes in attitudes between 2001 and 2002 are not predictive of
getting cable in 2003. For attitudes and sex preference, the coecients are extremely small and not
statistically signicant. The coecient on changes in autonomy is larger, but the sign suggests that
areas with an improvement in women's autonomy between 2001 and 2002 are actually less likely to
get cable between 2002 and 2003 (although this is not statistically signicant).
Although the test in Table 12 is appealing intuitively, there is likely to be a fair amount of
noise in the data on changes, which pushes the coecients towards zero. As an alternative, we can
consider whether, among villages without cable in 2001 but with cable by 2003, the 2001 levels of the
attitude variables are predictive of whether they get cable in 2002 or 2003. This will give us a sense
of whether the timing of the introduction of cable in this sample is correlated with the pre-existing
levels of attitudes. Table 13 shows these results. The dependent variable is 1 if cable was introduced
in 2002 and 0 if it was introduced in 2003. All of the coecients on the attitude variables are small,
and none are statistically signicant. Moreover, the direction of the eects is not consistent across
the variables.
Obviously with such a short panel it is dicult to rule out the possibility of such dierential
23trends. However, the results here suggest that, to the extent it is possible to test, there is little or no
evidence that the cable results are being driven by other trends in attitudes.
We can provide some additional, though limited, evidence on whether there were
pre-existing dierential trends by considering the timing of cable introduction somewhat more
closely. Since it typically takes 2 to 3 months from the time an entrepreneur is ready to set up
service in a village (once they have raised the funds and received a license, the equipment must be
shipped, a technician must install it, and the account must be activated) to the time it is
operational, if there were dierential trends driving both cable and women's status, arguably they
would likely be evident shortly before cable is actually turned on. At this point, the entrepreneur
will have already established that there is a local demand for cable, and may have even already
signed up customers. Therefore, as a limited test, we can examine whether there were any changes in
women's status already evident for villages that added cable shortly after the 2002 or 2003 surveys
were conducted. Three months after the nal survey, we gathered data on the month when cable was
rst introduced in each village (though only for those villages that added cable during the survey).
These data reveal that two of the villages that added cable between the 2002 and 2003 surveys added
it within two months of the 2002 survey, and three villages that had not added cable at the time of
the 2003 survey added it within three months of that survey.
Table 14 shows the means for the autonomy and attitudes towards beating variables for
these villages (the other variables have too few observations to be meaningful for such a small
sample). Between the 2001 and 2002 surveys, those villages that added cable shortly after the 2002
survey actually exhibit if anything a worsening trend in women's status. For example, the mean
measure of autonomy declined from -.27 to -.38 (in contrast to the slight improvement for those that
did not add cable (gure 2a)). Similarly, the mean number of situations where beating is considered
acceptable increased from 1.79 to 1.91 (those that did not add cable were largely unchanged (gure
2c)). Similarly, if we consider the three villages that added cable shortly after the 2003 survey,
between 2002 and 2003 the measure of autonomy declined from .036 to -.11, and the number of
situations in which beating is considered acceptable increased from 1.98 to 2.11. Thus in both sets of
villages, we nd that just before cable was added, there was if anything a slight trend towards
worsening, not improving, women's status. While these samples are small, the results here, and those
above, are nevertheless suggestive that there was no dierential trend in women's status prior to the
introduction of cable.
Overall, the expansion of cable television into new villages has arguably come about in large
24part due to a lowering of costs and increases in income. As costs have declined, more communities
have become protable cable markets. Overall, our identifying assumption is that villages that added
cable would not have otherwise changed dierently than those villages that did not add cable. While
it is dicult to test this assumption with such a short panel, the tests above reveal no substantial
evidence of dierential trends for these two groups. Further, gures 2a-2c show there do not appear
to be any real changes in women's status among groups that never receive cable (or those that have
it in all three periods). The only noticeable changes that occur in these graphs are the large, striking
changes for villages that add cable, and those changes only occur after cable is in place. Otherwise,
attitudes appear to be fairly stable over time. Further, most factors that are likely to shift attitudes
(and aect cable status), such as education, are fairly slow changing and could not lead to the
sudden changes observed in these gures. And the most obvious shifter that might potentially
change somewhat more quickly, namely income, is explicitly controlled for. Overall, it is dicult to
imagine another factor with a sharp, discrete change that drives both cable access and overall
attitudes (again, keeping in mind than any xed dierences are eliminated). However, this cannot be
tested, and we must maintain this assumption in order to interpret our results as the eect of cable
on women's status.
4.4 Eects of TV Watching
The preceding analysis focuses on the eects of cable access on attitudes and behaviors. From an
economic standpoint, however, the more interesting coecient may be the eect of TV watching, not
just the eect of having access. A simple way to estimate this eect in the context of our data is to
run the same set of regressions, except with a measure of television watching on the right hand side,
and instrument for watching with cable access. This is, of course, roughly equivalent to re-scaling the
coecients on access based on the rst stage eect, which can be intuited from Figure 1.
Appendix Table 3 shows these IV coecients. In all cases, we see qualitatively similar,
although larger results. This is exactly what we would expect. Adding cable has strong predictive
power for watching television (with an F-statistic of 10 or more in all cases), and the coecient is
less than one, so re-scaling increases the magnitude of the eect.
As mentioned, the primary advantage of these results is that actual television exposure is a
more economically interesting variable than access alone. However, the downside is that these
regressions ignore potentially important social interaction eects. That is, when we are analyzing
attitudes and other potentially socially constructed outcomes, the eect of introducing television to
25an entire area may be very dierent than the eect of introducing television to just one individual.
Given that in our context we see only the former \experiment," it is not really possible to interpret
the estimated eect of watching television as the eect we would expect to see if television was
randomly introduced to only certain individuals.
5 Mechanisms
The results in the previous section suggest a large eect of cable television on attitudes and
behaviors, but do not provide guidance about the mechanisms behind such an eect. The mechanism
alluded to in the introduction is greater exposure to the outside world: cable television in rural India
shows lifestyles in urban India, and the values and behaviors in urban areas are much more favorable
towards women than in rural areas. This mechanism is certainly consistent with anthropological
studies, both within India and elsewhere. Perhaps the best example is Pace (1993), who describes
large changes in perceptions about the outside world after the introduction of television in an
isolated area of the Amazon, including changes in knowledge of facts about the world outside, as well
as changes in perceptions of the status of the home village in the wider world.
To be more concrete about this mechanism, assume that an individual's attitudes are a
function of upbringing (for example, the average village attitudes) and what they learn on their own
later on in life, for example through interactions with peers. Television in eect may serve as a new
set of information or `peers' from which individuals learn. Denote the upbringing attitude y0 and the
attitudes portrayed on television as ytelevision. We assume that a weight  is put on upbringing, and
a weight 1    on television, which will depend on the availability of television. If there is no
television available,  = 1. Overall attitudes can be expressed
y = y0 + (1   )ytelevision
In this simple model, if the attitudes on television are more favorable towards women than that
average attitudes in your village or those you were brought up with, then introducing television will
make individual attitudes towards women more favorable.
This framework suggests at least one possible test of the validity of this mechanism: the
eect of television introduction should be larger in areas where y0 and ytelevision dier more. Since
television content is similar in all areas, this dierence will be larger when y0, the initial village level
attitudes, are more gender-biased. To test this hypothesis, we divide villages into two groups based
on their average attitudes in 2001 (we do separate divisions for autonomy, beating acceptability and
26son preference). We then explore the eect of cable on outcomes in each set of villages. Table 15
reports these results. For all three dependent variables, we nd much larger eects in areas with
initially worse attitudes { the eects in Columns 1, 3 and 5 are much larger than those in Columns 2,
4 and 6 (though they are only statistically signicantly dierent for son preference).
These results are at least consistent with the theory that television increases exposure to a
new set of peers with dierent attitudes, which causes individuals to change their attitudes and
behaviors. However, there are a variety of other possible mechanisms that could be causing this
result. For example, the increased availability of television could aect time allocation, social
interactions (for example, spending more time with others if television is watched communally, or
less time if private watching displaces other social interactions) household demand for goods they see
on television, or it may directly provide information that aects behaviors, such as the availability of
family planning services. Depending on the model, any of these mechanisms could produce the
eects observed here. Although Table 15 is consistent with the hypothesis of a change in peer groups,
it is certainly not conclusive. Much more would need to be done to establish conclusively that this
particular mechanism is what causes the changes in attitudes and behaviors observed in Section 4.
6 Conclusion
In this paper, we analyze the eect of exposure to cable television on attitudes towards women in
India. We argue that the introduction of cable television reduces son preference, fertility, and the
reported acceptability of beating, and increases women's autonomy and female school enrollment.
Overall, the eects are quite positive for women. It is also noteworthy that the large changes
observed are accomplished despite there being little or no direct targeted appeals, such as through
public service announcements or explicitly socially-oriented programming (such as the `Sabido
Method' soap operas used worldwide). It may be that cable television, with programming that
features lifestyles in both urban areas and in other countries, is an eective form of persuasion
because people emulate what they perceive to be desirable behaviors and attitudes, without the need
for an explicit appeal to do so.
There is a signicant and almost urgent focus in the policy debates in India (and elsewhere)
on interventions to alter attitudes towards women and girls, especially as the availability of
sex-selective abortion has resulted in sex ratios dramatically more skewed towards boys. This paper
suggests that a relatively simple and inexpensive \intervention" may actually have quite large eects
27on attitudes towards women. Since cable television is rapidly spreading all over India, this may lead
to changes in attitudes towards women even without targeted interventions. And this can occur even
in the face of poverty that keeps individual television ownership low, since people can and typically
do watch with friends or relatives.
As we think about policy, however, it is worth noting that the eects estimated in this
paper may be larger than what we would expect to see if cable were introduced more widely.
Although we have argued that pre-existing trends in attitudes are not driving the results, we cannot
rule out the possibility that television is introduced rst into areas that have the biggest potential for
change; those that are receptive to television may also be receptive to changing their gender
attitudes. This means that while there is an eect of television, and the magnitude of the eect is
correctly estimated within sample, the eect of further introduction may be smaller, or slower.
Nevertheless, given the magnitude of the eect estimated here, even much smaller eects could still
have the potential to make a signicant dierence for women in India.
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35Table 1. Summary Statistics on Cable Availability
Panel A: Cable Availability by Survey Round




Not During Survey 94
Panel B: Cable Availability in 2001 by State






Notes: This table shows summary statistics on cable availability, either over time or across
state in the rst sample year.
36Table 2. Village-Level Determinants of Cable Availability
Dependent Variable: Village Has Cable (in 2001)
Explanatory
Variables:
Log Average HH Income Per Capita :0771
(:044)
Log Population Density :0585
(:028)








Number of Observations 136
R2 .49
Standard errors in parentheses, clustered by village.
 signicant at 10%;  signicant at 5%;  signicant at 1%
Notes: This table shows the village-level determinants of having cable. An observation is
a village in 2001.
37Table 3. Summary Statistics on Dependent Variables
Panel A: Gender Attitudes
Mean Standard Deviation # Obs
Attitudes towards beating
Beating ever acceptable 0.621 0.485 9159
# of situations beating is ac-
ceptable
1.61 1.73 9159
Husband may hit if:
Unfaithful 0.244 0.429 9159
Family doesn't give money 0.204 0.403 9159
Show disrespect 0.308 0.461 9159
Go out without telling 0.306 0.461 9159
Neglect children 0.336 0.472 9159
Bad cook 0.215 0.411 9159
Autonomy: Respondent can make decisions about
Health care 0.566 0.495 9159
Purchases 0.556 0.496 9159
Visits to family/friends 0.549 0.497 9159
Autonomy: Respondent needs permission to visit
Market 0.561 0.537 9159
Friends 0.675 0.496 9159
Autonomy: Money
Resp. keeps own money 0.739 0.438 9159
Son Preference
Want next child to be a boy 0.549 0.497 2165
Panel B: Fertility and Education
Mean Standard Deviation # Obs
Average # children 1.107 1.78 8208
Change in # children 0.142 0.352 5472
Share in school, age 6-14 0.743 0.436 8587
Share dropout, ages 6-14 0.135 0.341 4455
Notes: This table shows summary statistics for the dependent variables used in the paper.
All of the autonomy, beating attitudes and son preference measures are binary. Son
preference is only asked of women who report wanting more children.
38Table 4. Correlations Between Outcomes and Demographics
Dependent Var.: Autonomy Beating Attitudes Son Preference # Children In school (6-14)
Explanatory
Variables:
Rural Area -0.137 0.7460 0.0622 0.220 -0.0542
Education 0.0335 -0.0461 -0.0316 -0.135 0.047
Log HH Income PC 0.0190 -0.0424 -0.0176 0.0801 0.0171
Age 0.035 0.006 -0.002 0.113 N/A
Muslim -0.485 -0.529 0.157 1.052 -0.137
Hindu -0.0318 0.195 0.0511 -0.3907 0.0478
Sched. Caste -0.130 -0.114 -0.134 0.3710 0.017
 signicant at 10%;  signicant at 5%;  signicant at 1%
Notes: This table reports the coecients from regressions of each outcome variable (au-
tonomy, beating attitudes, son preference, number of children and whether a child is in
school) on demographics. Each cell represents a separate regression, with no other controls
other than that demographic characteristic (and a constant).
39Table 5. Cable Television and Attitudes, OLS Regression
Panel A: Limited Controls
Dependent Variable: Autonomy Attitudes Son Preference
Explanatory
Variables:


















Year FE YES YES YES
Number of Observations 9159 9159 1998
R
2 .05 .02 .08
Panel B: With Controls
Dependent Variable: Autonomy Attitudes Son Preference
Explanatory
Variables:





































































Year FE YES YES YES
State FE YES YES YES
Number of Observations 9159 9159 1998
R
2 .16 .22 .22
Standard errors in parentheses, clustered by village
 signicant at 10%;
 signicant at 5%;
 signicant at 1%
Notes: This table shows OLS regressions of outcomes on cable access. Column 1 reports the eect on
the rst principal component of a number of autonomy measures (does the woman make decisions
about her health, purchases or visits, does she need permission to go to the market or visit her
family and can she keep her own money). Column 2 reports the eect on attitudes towards beating
(the sum of the number of situations in which the woman reports spousal beating is acceptable).
Column 3 reports the eect on son preference - the share of women who report wanting their next
child to be a boy (conditional on wanting another child).
40Table 6. Cable television and Attitudes, Fixed Eect Regressions
Dependent Variable: Autonomy Attitudes Son Preference
Explanatory
Variables:






















































Individual FE YES YES YES
Number of Observations 9159 9159 1998
R2 .91 .86 .93
Standard errors in parentheses, clustered by village
 signicant at 10%;  signicant at 5%;  signicant at 1%
Notes: This table shows individual-level regressions of our dependent variables on cable
access. Column 1 reports the eect on the rst principal component of a number of
autonomy measures (does the woman make decisions about her health, purchases or visits,
does she need permission to go to the market or visit her family and can she keep her
own money). Column 2 reports the eect on attitudes towards beating (the sum of the
number of situations in which the woman reports spousal beating is acceptable). Column
3 reports the eect on son preference - the share of women who report wanting their next
child to be a boy (conditional on wanting another child).
41Table 7. Eect of Cable: Matching Results
Panel A: Attitudes, Autonomy and Son Preference
Dependent Variable: Coecient, SATE Standard Error
Autonomy 0.1601 0.0532
Beating Attitudes -0.1737 0.0837
Son Preference -0.1311 0.0541
Panel B: Education, Determinants of Being Enrolled/Dropping Out
Group: Coecient, SATE Standard Error
Girls, Ages 6-10 0.0728 0.0406
Boys, Ages 6-10 -0.0296 0.0614
Girls, Ages 11-14 -0.0540 0.0692
Boys, Ages 11-14 0.0655 0.0532
Panel C: Fertility, Change in Number of Children
Group: Coecient, SATE Standard Error
Full Sample -0.0806 0.0389
Age <35 -0.1205 0.0658
 signicant at 10%;  signicant at 5%;  signicant at 1%
Notes: This table shows the eect of cable on outcomes, based on matching
villages based on ex-ante characteristics and then comparing the subsequent
changes in outcomes across villages that do and do not get access to cable. In
all cases we match to the 4 nearest neighbor villages. The matching procedure
is described in more detail in the empirical strategy section.
42Table 8. Share of Urban Rural Dierence Explained by Television
Outcome Urban Mean Rural Mean, No television Eect of television Share Explained
Autonomy 0.120 -0.324 0.1896 42.6%
Beating 0.964 1.378 -0.1888 45.5%
Son Preference 0.500 0.6728 -0.1214 70.1%
Notes: Table displays calculations of the share of the urban-rural dierence in each dependent variable
that is made up by the introduction of television. The urban area is Delhi. The rural mean is among
the rural areas that do not have cable access. Share explained is simply the eect size (column 4)
divided by the dierence between Column 2 and Column 3.
43Table 9. Cable Television, Education and Fertility, OLS Regression
Dependent Variable: Enrolled in School Change in # Kids
Girls, 6-14 Boys, 6-14 (including Current Pregnancies)
Explanatory
Variables:
























































Year FE YES YES YES
Number of Observations 4594 4988 5423
R2 .09 .04 .15
Standard errors in parentheses, clustered by village
 signicant at 10%;  signicant at 5%;  signicant at 1%
Notes: This table shows OLS regressions of fertility and education on cable access.
Columns 1 and 2 show the eect of cable on children's school enrollment, for girls and
































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































45Table 11. Cable Television and Fertility
Dependent Variable: Change in # Kids Wants More Children
(Including Current Pregnancies)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
All Age <=35 Age>35 Age<=35
Explanatory
Variables:
























































Individual FE YES YES YES YES
Number of Observations 5423 3423 2000 2251
R2 .57 .53 .61 .87
Standard errors in parentheses, clustered by village
 signicant at 10%;  signicant at 5%;  signicant at 1%
Notes: This table shows the eect of cable television on the change in number of children
between years (Columns 1 through 3) and reported desire for more children (Column 4). If
an individual is pregnant in year t, that is counted as an increase in a child between year
t   1 and year t. The dataset includes two observations per person, one in 2002 and one in
2003 since we are using changes, so we need 2001 as the rst comparison year. Column 1
includes all women, Columns 2 and 4 are limited to women under 35 and Column 3 is limited
to women over 35.
46Table 12. Trends in Attitudes and Cable Adoption
Dependent Variable: Village Adopted Cable between 2002 and 2003
Explanatory
Variables:
Change in Autonomy 2001-2002  :172
(:224)
Change in Beating Att. 2001-2002  :0049
(:143)
Change in Sex Preference 2001-2002  :0279
(:141)






















































Number of Observations 79 79 78
R2 .19 .18 .18
Standard errors in parentheses
 signicant at 10%;  signicant at 5%;  signicant at 1%
Notes: This table examines the predictors of getting cable television between 2002
and 2003 and tests for whether trends in the gender attitude variables are important
predictors of television introduction. The data are for 2002 and is limited to villages
that did not have cable in 2002. The dependent variable is equal to 1 if the village
got cable between 2002 and 2003 and 0 if they did not. The independent variables
on attitudes are changes in village level averages between 2001 and 2002.
47Table 13. Initial Attitudes and Timing of Cable Introduction































































Number of Observations 21 21 20
R2 .23 .21 .22
Standard errors in parentheses
 signicant at 10%;  signicant at 5%;  signicant at 1%
Notes: The data for this table is limited to villages that got cable during the survey.
The dependent variable is equal to 1 if the village got cable in 2002 (early adopter)
and 0 if they got it in 2003 (late adopter). The regressors are the attitude and
behavior and control variables for 2001.
48Table 14. Trends in Attitudes for \Early" Adopters
Changes 2001 to 2002 for Adopters 2-3 Months After 2002 Survey




Changes 2002 to 2003 for Adopters 2-3 Months After 2003 Survey




Notes: This table shows trends in autonomy and beating attitudes for villages that adopt
cable within 2-3 months after the previous survey. These \early" adopters would have the
knowledge of getting cable at the previous survey. Looking at the changes therefore is a
test for pre-existing trends.
49Table 15. Mechanism Test: Eect Breakdown by Initial Attitudes
Dependent Variable: Autonomy Beating Son Preference
Initial State Low High High Low High Low
Explanatory
Variables:












































































































Individual FE YES YES YES YES YES YES
Number of Obs 4599 4560 4560 4599 1003 993
R2 .89 .9 .88 .73 .88 .93
Standard errors in parentheses, clustered by village
 signicant at 10%;  signicant at 5%;  signicant at 1%
Notes: This table shows the eect of cable television on individual-level attitudes, broken down by the average
initial attitude level in the village. Columns 1 and 2 break down based on autonomy, Columns 3 and 4 based
on beating attitudes and Columns 5 and 6 based on son preference.
50Appendix Tables
Appendix Table 1. Eect of Cable on Beating Attitude, Autonomy Components
Eect of Cable Standard Error
Attitudes towards beating: Husband May Hit if
Unfaithful 0.0103 0.0148
Family doesn't give money -0.0481 0.0196
Show Disrespect -0.0262 0.0231
Go out without telling 0.0054 0.0119
Neglect Children -0.0543 0.0206
Bad Cook -0.0750 0.0259
Autonomy: Respondent can make decisions about
Health Care 0.0212 0.0244
Purchases 0.0894 0.0258
Visits to Family/Friends -0.0048 0.0273




Resp. keeps own Money 0.0352 0.0128
 signicant at 10%;  signicant at 5%;  signicant at 1%
Notes: This table shows the eect of cable access on the components of
the autonomy and beating measure. All outcomes are binary.
51Appendix Table 2. Eect of Cable by Age, Education
Panel A: Breakdown by Age













Panel B: Breakdown by Education















 signicant at 10%;  signicant at 5%;  signicant at 1%
Notes: This table shows the eects of cable broken down by age and education. In
both cases, the dataset is split in half, so the younger group is the youngest half of the
dataset and the less educated group is the bottom half in terms of years of education.
In Panel A, the eects on son preference are not shown because this questions is
only asked to younger women who are still planning to have more children.
52Appendix Table 3. Eect of TV Watching, Instrumented with Cable Access
Eect of Watching TV (IV Estimate) Standard Error
Attitudes, Autonomy and Son Preference
Autonomy 0.4841 0.1352
Beating Attitudes -0.4799 0.1682
Son Preference -0.3035 0.1053
Fertility
Change in # of Children, All -0.2051 0.0586
Change in # of Children, Under 35 -0.3482 0.1152
Change in # of Children, Over 35 -0.0016 0.0209
Education
In School, Girls 6-14 0.0700 0.0459
In School, Boys 6-14 -0.0077 0.0967
Dropout, Girls 6-14 -0.1468 0.0521
Dropout, Boys 6-14 0.1918 0.2147
 signicant at 10%;  signicant at 5%;  signicant at 1%
Notes: This table shows regressions of the outcome variables on whether the surveyed individual
reports watching television in the last week. This measure of watching is instrumented with cable
access. The regressions include the same controls as in the non-IV regressions in the text { income,
year dummies, income and education interacted with the year dummies.
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